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Current admission criteria for migrants tend to favor those who are well to do, able 
bodied, and well qualified. This leads to migration patterns that exacerbate global 
inequalities. In this article, I argue that we should alter admission criteria in order to 
alleviate some of the negative effects of global inequality of opportunity. In support of 
this argument, I discuss two global justice theories that are central to borders and 
migration, specifically a cosmopolitan position that argues for more open borders and 
a nationalist position that emphasizes the importance of states being in control of their 
borders. In particular, I address David Miller’s objections to using open borders to 
remedy global inequality of opportunity. The argument I present agrees with the 
benefits of a conception of justice that allows for degrees of partiality and a state’s right 
to control its borders. However, I argue that the roles of Western states in particular in 
perpetuating global inequality of opportunity lead to moral demands, which can in part 
be met by fairer migration. Finally, I consider what kind of criteria fairer immigration 
should take into account. The system I propose would rank migrants based on their 
individual access to opportunities, how little their emigration would affect the 
opportunities in the country they are emigrating from, and to what extent it might 
improve the opportunities in the country they are moving to. 
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Introduction: Why is migration relevant to questions of global 
equality of opportunity? 
Most normative approaches to political philosophy proceed from the generally held 
assumption that all human beings are of equal worth. However, the kinds of 
implications this assumption has for how one should actually treat people are hotly 
disputed. For although most people agree that all human beings are equally valuable, 
political institutions, private companies, and the international community treat 
people differently based on many different criteria, such as religious, economic, 
linguistic, or national distinctions. One of the ways in which people are treated 
differently is in regards to whether they are allowed into a country or not. An 
important task for political philosophers is to consider which kinds of differentiated 
treatment are morally justified and which are not.  
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
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When it comes to migration and questions of global justice, a useful distinction 
can be made between nationalist and cosmopolitan positions. Whereby the former 
emphasizes the reasons states are justified in prioritizing their own citizens over 
foreigners and argues for controlled migration, the latter emphasizes the illegitimacy 
of many migration restrictions and argues for open borders or more freedom of 
movement.1 In terms of immigration, they disagree over whether selective 
immigration regulations are normatively valid, and in which situations and to what 
extent this might be the case. Broadly put, cosmopolitans argue that the demands of 
global justice are so strong that a state is only justified in implementing limited 
migration restrictions, while nationalists argue that the global justice demands are 
weaker and that it is in everyone’s basic interest that states have comprehensive 
control over their migration restrictions. In this article, I am specifically concerned 
with voluntary migration, as opposed to forced displacement2, and with one of the 
arguments often put forth for the cosmopolitan position, namely global equality of 
opportunity. I will be using the equality of opportunity argument in order to defend 
a fairer migration model. This model evaluates whether migration regulations are 
justified not merely based on the impact a migrant might have on the country they 
are moving to, but also considers the effect on the country they are leaving, and the 
improvement in opportunities for the individual migrant.   
Before considering why migration might be relevant to questions of global equality 
of opportunity, I will first describe what such an equality might consist of.  Perhaps 
the most prominent exponent of the cosmopolitan position on migration is Joseph 
Carens, who argues that open borders are necessary partly in order to accomplish 
equality of opportunity.3 Carens describes the equality of opportunity argument as 
follows:  
Within democratic states we all recognize, at least in principle, that access to social 
positions should be determined by an individual’s actual talents and effort and not 
limited on the basis of birth-related characteristics such as class, race, or gender 
that are not relevant to the capacity to perform well in the position. This ideal of 
equal opportunity is intimately linked to the view that all human beings are of 
equal moral worth, that there are no natural hierarchies of birth that entitle people 
to advantageous social positions. But you have to be able to move to where the 
opportunities are in order to take advantage of them. So, freedom of movement is 
an essential prerequisite for equality of opportunity (2013, 227-228). 
Simply put, this is an argument for open borders. Moreover, it proceeds from the 
premise that the stark divide between nations in access to opportunities is vast; that 
where people are born is a matter of chance, and that this disparity is therefore 
fundamentally unfair and should be rectified. In other words, it would seem that if 
we believe all people are equally valuable, we should provide them with similar access 
to opportunities. This argument is consistent with economic and social differences 
between people, often referred to as inequalities in outcomes, and is based on the 
intuitively appealing idea that people should have an equal chance to attain favored 
social positions. However, it is still necessary to specify what these opportunities 
consist in, and which social goods equality of opportunity relies upon. As Carens puts 
it, “[a] closely related point is that a commitment to equal worth entails some 
commitment to economic, social, and political equality, partly as a means of realizing 
equal freedom and equal opportunity and partly as a desirable end in itself” (2013, p. 
228). I therefore initially consider equality of opportunity broadly to mean access to 
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social positions, and that this access relies on the availability of social goods such as 
access to health care, education, and the job market.4 As we will get back to below, 
however, how one chooses a particular metric, and whether one can make a global 
metric of opportunities, is hotly contested. 
This is quite a broad definition to proceed from, as it hardly seems unreasonable 
to make the point that current global differences in opportunities are unfair and 
something we should remedy. However, this perspective raises questions of whether 
the goal of just policies should be the complete elimination of differences, the 
mitigation of significant differences, and what complete equality might look like. 
Furthermore, how far is fairer migration supposed to move us towards this goal? The 
answers to these questions lie beyond the scope of this article, and I am not advocating 
an ideal situation. Rather, I am pointing to current unfairness in migration practices 
and making some suggestions as to how this unfairness could be mitigated. Thus far, 
I can be seen as following Miller, whose stated aim was “to sketch the outlines of a 
legitimate and justifiable immigration policy for a democratic state in the world that 
we actually inhabit, replete with inequalities and injustices.” (2016b: 2) In short, I am 
moving from broadly uncontroversial views on global differences in opportunity, to 
some potentially more controversial suggestions about how these differences can be 
reduced. I begin by addressing two objections to using equality of opportunity as an 
argument for open borders, specifically (1) that it is problematic to compare 
opportunities between different societies, and (2) that opportunities are largely the 
result of states’ domestic policies. In light of this discussion, I then consider why 
altered migration regulations, rather than open borders, might contribute towards 
global equality of opportunity, before finally presenting a sketch of migration 
regulations that can contribute towards this goal. 
 
 
Nationalist objections to global equality of opportunity 
Before discussing how this type of equality of opportunity is relevant to questions of 
migration, I will consider some objections to the argument that in order to have global 
equality of opportunity, we need open borders. In Strangers in Our Midst, David 
Miller presents a comprehensive and convincing defense of the nationalist position, 
and argues against the relevance of global equality of opportunity for evaluating 
whether migration restrictions are just or not. The argument I propose must therefore 
be able to meet his objections. Miller attacks the equality of opportunity argument for 
open borders by arguing that: (1) there are problems in evaluating opportunities 
across cultures, (2) the level of opportunities are largely the result of domestic politics 
in states, and (3) there is a possibility of a brain drain from the countries of origin. 
The point about the brain drain will be addressed in the next section. Before doing 
so, I will comment on Miller’s other two points in particular and the nationalist 
position in general.  
 
 
One cannot compare opportunities across cultures 
First, let us consider the suggestion that evaluating opportunities across cultures 
poses problems. As Miller puts it: “There is no agreed metric that can be applied to 
rank the sets because how particular opportunities are to be valued relative to one 
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another will depend upon the local culture” (Miller 2016a: 46). It should be stressed 
that Miller does not think this applies to basic human rights, and he draws a strict 
division between basic rights and equality of opportunity. The differences which he 
does not think can be used as a normative basis when it comes to alleviating global 
inequality of opportunity through migration, are differences relating to things such 
as “to get an education, to enter the job market, and to make money” (Miller 2016a: 
44). While the merits of such a differentiation might be debated, let us take it for 
granted for the purpose of the present discussion.  
Miller’s argument does not claim that it is difficult to measure the differences 
between cultures, but rather that these kinds of metrics out of necessity prioritize one 
particular cultural vantage point. Different nations and cultures prefer different kinds 
of opportunities; therefore a comparison between them is not relevant to questions 
of global justice and migration. Another formulation of this argument is put forward 
by Gillian Brock, who argues,  
Either we must try to articulate a version of equality of opportunity that mentions 
particular social positions that are favored, and opportunities to achieve these are 
equalized, or we allow much cultural variation on what counts as a favored social 
position, and the standards of living or levels of well-being that they enable are to 
be equalized (2015: 29).  
Put simply, the problem is that either the favored social positions and standards of 
well-being are too broad, and therefore cannot be useful as a comparative metric, or 
the metric favors some particular cultural standard over others.  
Now, while it is certainly the case that various countries prioritize different sectors, 
such as health, education, and the job market, it does not necessarily follow that their 
ability to prioritize these sectors is the result of national priorities. And, if their ability 
to provide opportunities is significantly affected by outside factors, the fact that they 
might prioritize various sectors does not necessarily remove the moral culpability for 
creating this disparity. We consider this more closely in the next section, so let us first 
turn to the contention that it is in fact necessarily parochial to rank these 
opportunities up against each other.  
It is clear that different cultures have variations in preferences. However, that does 
not mean that no significant overlap exists, and that this overlap might not be 
meaningful in discussions about variations in opportunities. For while differences in 
preferences might vary, it is a much stronger claim that they vary to such a degree 
that comparisons between them are not valuable in moral discussions about 
differences in equality of opportunity. After all, one would be hard pressed to make 
the case that some cultures prefer high unemployment and poor access to decent 
health care. Indeed, just because states have internal variations with respect to 
preferences, we do not consider this a reason to abandon an attempt at overall 
considerations of justice and opportunities in the domestic setting. And while the 
variation is undoubtedly greater in the international setting, the mere fact of 
difference does not make comparisons invalid as foundations for normative 
evaluations. As Darrel Moellendorf argues, Brock’s cultural variation challenge can 
be met “if there were an account of the goods – for which opportunities should be 
equalized – that is both free-standing, that does not derive simply from the cultural 
understandings of a particular culture, and sufficiently sensitive to empirical matters 
as to capture real differences of opportunity” (2006: 309). In short, we would need a 
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sufficiently general and empirically sensitive metric in order to make valuable 
comparisons.  
Furthermore, access to education, the job market and decent health care certainly 
seem to be likely contenders as aspects of society that are globally valued. As Eszter 
Kollar points out, “some global egalitarians have responded [to problems of global 
value pluralism] by proposing a core set of goods that should be seen as all-purpose 
means in global political life” (2016: 4). So, while the content to be included in such 
an evaluative standard will be hotly disputed, the fact of value pluralism does not 
mean that a variety of meaningful evaluative standards cannot be found.   
There are also various ways in which one can approach the problem of deciding 
on an overall metric. One might concede that it is difficult to agree on such a global 
metric, and yet believe that meaningful comparisons can be made in the case of 
evaluating the opportunities of individual migrants. As I propose below, a measure 
of opportunities for individual migrants might take into account their access to 
education, the job market and health care in both the country they are moving from 
and the receiving country. So, while we might struggle to create an overall metric for 
all people, we can likely say something meaningful about specific migrants’ access to 
opportunities and how these may or may not be improved.  
In short, I do not make the claim that we can create some kind of overall objective 
metric by which to consider all opportunities and global justice. I am merely 
contending that some relative comparisons are normatively meaningful, in particular 
when it comes to judging potential migrants. Furthermore, while all people probably 
cannot agree on a standard system of differentiation, they can surely provide some 
facts as a basis for reasonable democratic deliberation of responsibility. Perhaps a 
general description of variations in opportunities and obligations that stem from 
them could be put forth. After all, we seldom demand empirical exactitude on 
domestic considerations of justice from philosophers, so why should this be the case 
in the international setting?  
 
One should not compare opportunities across cultures 
Another and perhaps more central aspect of Miller’s objection to the possibility of 
evaluating differences is that it is not fair to use these varying opportunities as a 
measure, since they follow from the self-determination of the countries in question. 
In other words, these differences are largely the results of different priorities made by 
different states, and therefore not relevant for the current discussion. As Kollar 
formulates this nationalist argument, “[g]lobal equality of opportunity wrongly 
neglects the normative relevance of national self-determination that inevitably 
produces different opportunity sets for different nationalities. […] It is not that we 
cannot compare, but that we should not compare opportunities across borders” (2016: 
4). Therefore, we must consider the question of how these differences in 
opportunities come about, and make the case for why these differences are in fact 
relevant for our present discussion.  
As most people would readily agree, the differences in opportunities across 
borders are vast, in particular between countries in the Global North and the Global 
South. However, there is a lot of disagreement about whether, and to what degree, 
these differences are the outcome of legitimate national priorities or due to other 
causes. A nationalist position might state that these differences in opportunities are 
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not normatively relevant to questions of admission policies, insofar as they are the 
result of domestic political decisions for which the nation can be held responsible. 
Higgins describes this nationalist argument as follows:  
If the global poor are understood merely as needy strangers whose poverty is 
causally unrelated to the affluence of the Global North, then choosing admission 
policies in a way that is responsive to their interests appears, wrongly, to be a 
matter of charity (2013: 30).  
An initial objection to the nationalist position might question why migrants 
should be held responsible for the domestic policies in their home countries. Indeed, 
most of these kinds of decisions are taken before and without most individuals’ 
explicit blessing. Why should the opportunities in a country therefore count for 
anything in evaluating whether migration restrictions are justified? A nationalist will 
likely respond that the relevant question here is who bears the responsibility to fix 
global disparities in opportunities. How can one make the case that a prosperous 
country should alleviate global differences, if they are not responsible for bringing 
these differences about? While I do think this objection has merit, the nationalist 
position should nevertheless be addressed. 
It is clearly correct to state that the level of opportunities is to a certain extent the 
result of domestic policy. However, this is hardly the whole story. The level of 
opportunities in countries is also influenced by other countries’ foreign policy, trade 
policy, and the international political system to a considerable degree. Even when it 
is difficult to show exactly how disadvantages come about, this still does not mean 
that the causes lack normative validity or do not place moral demands on us. The 
point is that global inequalities generally have complex causes, and are not merely due 
to national priorities. As Kollar (2016: 5) says, “Those differences that are not the 
outcome of legitimate national priorities, instead, should be judged as unjust global 
inequalities of opportunity to be properly mitigated from life-prospects.” 
One way of explicating this unequal relationship can be found in the work of 
Thomas Pogge. He points out how certain features of the international system 
systematically disadvantage the ability of other countries to fulfill the human rights 
of their citizens. For instance, Pogge (2001: 20) describes the “international 
borrowing privilege” and the "international resources privilege.”  The former in part 
“facilitates borrowing by destructive governments” and “imposes upon democratic 
successor regimes the often huge debts of their corrupt predecessors” (Pogge 2001: 
20). “Resources privilege” allows the group in power in a country to be considered 
the legitimate owners of that country’s resources, whether their citizens are 
represented or repressed. In short, Pogge explicates how these privileges maintain an 
unfair international system, which benefits the interests of some in richer and more 
influential states over others. If we take this to be the case, it seems clear that the vast 
differences in opportunities between states are not the result of legitimate national 
priorities, but rather the result of unfair trading practices. In other words, regardless 
of how some countries might decide to prioritize, the vast differences in global 
opportunities will remain.  
Another point pertains to aspects of the international financial system, which 
allows for vast transfers of wealth from poor to rich countries. A recently published 
report by Global Financial Integrity and the Center for Applied Research at the 
Norwegian School of Economics shows how the financial resources that flow from 
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poor to rich countries are far greater than those that flow in the opposite direction, 
and that the international financial system allows for this reverse distributive effect:  
In 2012, the last year of recorded data, developing countries received a total of 
$1.3tn, including all aid, investment, and income from abroad. But that same year 
some $3.3tn flowed out of them. In other words, developing countries sent $2tn 
more to the rest of the world than they received. If we look at all years since 1980, 
these net outflows add up to an eye-popping total of $16.3tn – that’s how much 
money has been drained out of the global south over the past few decades (Hickel 
2017). 
In sum, it can be argued that there are many aspects of the international economic, 
political and financial system that contribute to countries’ financial ability and 
political stability.  Furthermore, since the level of opportunity in a country relies 
directly upon the government’s ability to deliver decent health care, education, and 
job markets, a grossly unfair international system that perpetuates these differences 
seems particularly relevant when considering states’ responsibilities to alleviate them.  
 
 
Why might migration be relevant to alleviate global inequality 
of opportunity?  
Even allowing for the arguments that some states benefit from an unjust global system 
and contribute to perpetuating global inequality, some might ask why this inequality 
is relevant to questions of migration and admission policies. Some people might 
indeed say that all I have done is show that some trade policies are unjust, that these 
affect the levels of opportunities, and that this is something that should be remedied. 
However, why should the solution to this problem have anything to do with 
migration? Responding to this challenge requires answering the question of how open 
borders, or increased migration, might contribute to alleviating this inequality. One 
way to respond is to follow Carens, who states,  “Freedom of movement would 
contribute to a reduction of existing political, social, and economic inequalities. There 
are millions of people in poor states today who long for the freedom of economic 
opportunity they could find in Europe or North-America” (2013: 228). But as Miller 
and Higgins, among others, have pointed out, the idea that open borders would 
significantly reduce global inequalities does not mesh well with how migration 
actually occurs. Indeed, as it is only those who can afford to who can travel, it has 
been argued that open borders would not contribute towards alleviating global 
inequality of opportunity, and might even negatively affect it.5 According to Higgins, 
the open border position relies “on an idealized conception of the typical poor 
migrant’s social wherewithal, as well as on an explanatorily nationalist understanding 
of the causes of severe poverty” (2013: 64). In other words, this position builds on a 
wrongly held belief that the causes of severe poverty are local, and that people lacking 
opportunities and basic rights have the social and financial resources to migrate. As 
Higgins puts it, “the structural causes of social disadvantage in virtue of which 
persons are vulnerable to severe poverty are not themselves addressed by changing 
potential migrants’ location of residence” (2013: 64). 
Since open borders might not be a solution to the problem of alleviating global 
inequalities of opportunity, why should we care about migration at all in connection 
with global inequalities? Here we must distinguish between arguments for open 
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borders and arguments for fairer migration. Although the former might not improve 
global equality of opportunity, it seems more likely that fairer migration, which takes 
into account global inequality of opportunity, would do so. Nevertheless, some might 
argue that given the effort it would take to alter unfair admission practices, we should 
instead focus on remedying an unfair international system. As Pogge argues, “With 
the political effort it would take to pressure some Western government to admit an 
extra hundred needy foreigners, we could alternatively pressure this same 
government to allocate a few extra million dollars to global poverty eradication” 
(1997: 17). In other words, rather than making the difficult point that we should 
admit people according to fairer migration criteria, our efforts are better spent 
arguing for more practical measures to reduce extreme poverty. 
One can respond to this objection in several ways: first, by pointing out that 
arguing for fairer migration will also indirectly highlight the inequalities inherent in 
the global system. In other words, a normative reconstruction of our admission 
criteria might draw attention to global inequalities, which most definitely need 
addressing. Second, one might show how some unfair admission criteria actually 
contribute to, indeed are perhaps even integral to, the unjust international order. So, 
whereas poverty eradication might indeed give more of a return for each dollar spent, 
unfair admission criteria can be shown to play an integral role in a globally unequal 
system that contributes to extreme poverty. Third, one might contend that this is not 
a zero sum game, and that the more arguments that are raised concerning global 
inequalities and the systems that perpetuate them, the better.  
In short, I argue that because many affluent countries are apparently unwilling to 
rectify global inequalities, and in some cases even actively perpetuate them, these 
countries have a moral obligation to admit migrants on fair terms. I am not claiming 
that this is the ideal solution to the problem of global inequality of opportunities, 
merely that it is relevant to questions of justice and migration. While these arguably 
justifiable demands for fairer migration might not be met either, it is still important 
to point them out. 
Finally, some people might criticize both open borders and my suggestions for 
fairer migration criteria by pointing out that states have a right to control their 
borders, and that this right is needed, and normatively justified, in order to uphold 
the basic functions of a liberal democratic state. Miller states that liberal democracies 
have a right to control their borders due to concerns over “self-determination, the 
functioning of democracy, and population size” (2016a: 75). So there are good reasons 
to assume that some selective admission criteria are necessary to facilitate the proper 
functioning of a working democracy. However, even though a state might be justified 
in limiting and controlling immigration, the migration restrictions that a state 
implements can still be evaluated as to whether they are conducive to global equality 
of opportunity or not.  
The question then arises of what type of admission criteria would contribute to 
global equality of opportunity. If states are justified in controlling immigration, and 
open borders are not conducive to global equality, what kind of immigration 
regulations would alleviate global inequalities of opportunity? Furthermore, how can 
we practically evaluate whether states’ immigration regulations are appropriate to 
achieving such a goal? As previously discussed, a universally accepted metric of global 
equality of opportunity is unlikely, and states are more likely to have readily available 
information on the opportunities of specific migrants seeking admittance. 
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Specifically, countries are more likely to be able to deliberate on relative differences 
in opportunities between sending and receiving countries than the effect migration 
regulations might have on overall global opportunities. The most readily available 
data for countries to consider is the impact a potential migrant has on the country 
they come from, the country they are moving to, and the effect of the move on the 
individual migrants. These factors could work as proxies, allowing migration 
regulations overall to be conducive to global equality of opportunity. Put simply, the 
moral reasons for countries to alter their admission criteria are the vast global 
disparities in opportunities, and the practical way to alter the admission criteria is 
based on the data readily available to the countries in question. In the following, I 
present an outline for what such fairer admission criteria would look like.  
 
 
What kind of migration criteria would alleviate global inequality of 
opportunity?  
In order to describe fairer migration regulations, I have to be able to find some criteria 
that are empirically viable, and sensitive to both the effect on the individual migrants’ 
opportunities, as well as to the effect on the overall opportunities in the country they 
are moving from and to. In brief, one needs criteria to evaluate whether and to what 
degree allowing someone to migrate alleviates global inequality of opportunity. In the 
following, I describe which criteria I believe can fulfill this function, before briefly 
considering some objections that my model for fairer migration criteria might face. 
The admission criteria I propose that can manage this must evaluate whether 
migrating on balance: (1) does not negatively impact the overall level of opportunities 
in the country of origin through a brain drain effect, (2) positively affects the overall 
level of opportunities in the receiving country, and (3) distinguishes to which degree 
a migrant's opportunities will be increased by moving.  
This should not be considered an exhaustive list of factors for how migration 
affects global equality of opportunity. One might for example plausibly argue that it 
is necessary to consider the effect of migration regulations on global equality of 
opportunity, as in the overall level of opportunities globally. Some might indeed 
contend that increased overall migration positively contributes to the global economy 
and thereby opportunities in general. However, the three factors listed above – effect 
on country of origin, effect on receiving country, and effect on the opportunities for 
the individual migrant – seem to be particularly relevant and the factors for which we 
are most likely to find readily available data. Furthermore, based on the discussion of 
global metrics of opportunities above, comparisons of potential migrants’ 
opportunities in sending and receiving countries are more likely to be readily 
available, and empirically sound, than some ideal global metric.  
 
Brain drain, the effects on receiving country and individual migrant 
Moving on to these specific factors, we should first consider how a brain drain effect 
could negatively affect countries that migrants are moving from. As the phrase 
implies, this effect is related to the problems countries face when much of the human 
capital in a country moves abroad. Miller describes this phenomenon, saying, 
the ones who have the resources – the savings and the education – that enable them 
to do this will be the ones who are already relatively advantaged in their societies 
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of origin. […] It may even turn out that the opportunities of those left behind are 
reduced in absolute terms, if those leaving are skilled professionals who would 
otherwise provide education, health services, or competent administration in their 
home country (2016a: 48).  
While there is some disagreement as to the supposed effects more open migration 
might have on brain drain, this is not the place for that discussion.6 However, it is 
worth considering the negative systemic effects that are caused by brain drains as a 
result of current migration patterns. As Higgins says: “Large-scale emigration, in fact, 
initiates a self-perpetuating cycle of underdevelopment in already poor countries, 
since lost human development prospects both discourage emigrants from returning 
and encourage more residents to leave” (2013: 67). Furthermore, states are 
increasingly using highly selective immigration standards, in order to attract the 
kinds of migrants they wish to admit. Ayelet Shachar points out that “[b]y continually 
‘retooling and recalibrating’ selective skills-based admission avenues to attract the 
best and brightest, governments engaged in the global race for talent have 
demonstrated their willingness and their ability to intervene in the market for the 
highly skilled” (2016: 180). 
So, if we wish to avoid the negative effects of brain drain, how will this affect our 
admission criteria? Intuitively, it implies that when considering migration 
restrictions, we should weigh the impact the departing migrant has on the overall 
level of opportunities in the country of origin. A likely result of this could be that we 
should allow more migration of skilled professionals from countries with more 
overall opportunities to countries with fewer opportunities than the other way 
around. This is due to skilled professionals contributing significantly to the overall 
level of social goods that opportunities rely upon. In order to have a decent health 
care system, one needs doctors, and in order to have good public education, one needs 
teachers. When it comes to unskilled migrants, it would seem that fewer restrictions 
would apply to those moving from less affluent to more affluent societies; one might 
even argue that according to this first criteria, the less skilled the better. This is due to 
a large number of unskilled workers often being a strain on social goods such as health 
care and education, as well as contributing to more competition in the job market. 
Such evaluations must furthermore be made on the basis of an examination of the 
opportunities in different countries, as the needs and supply of skilled and unskilled 
workers will vary from country to country. Different countries also have varying 
levels of resources with which to provide opportunities for their citizens, and the 
impact of skilled and unskilled emigration will vary. Some countries will benefit more 
from emigration, thereby freeing up opportunities in the labor market for the 
domestic populations, whereas others would suffer more if important institutions 
were affected by a lack of human capital. 
Second, the effect the migrant might have on the receiving country also needs to 
be taken into account. In relation to this second criterion, similar evaluations to those 
above must be made, but with the emphasis on the receiving country. Furthermore, 
in order for the migration restrictions to contribute to global equality of opportunity, 
one needs to balance the effects on both countries against each other. If the effect of 
a proposed admission policy greatly benefits either the sending or receiving country 
to the detriment of the other, it would seem to be problematic. However, if one 
country benefits greatly, while the other country is only slightly negatively affected, 
the admission policy would appear to be fairer.  
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Third, one also needs to consider the effect migration might have on the 
opportunities of individual migrants. People have differing levels of opportunity in 
their countries of origin, due to different factors, such as varying levels of 
unemployment and access to affordable education. This third criterion will therefore 
allow us to prioritize individual migrants, where the effect on the first two factors, the 
sending and receiving countries, is similar. In short, it would enable prioritizing those 
migrants whose individual opportunities would increase the most by being admitted, 
while deprioritizing potential migrants who would benefit less.  
 
What would a fairer migration model look like? 
So, how might we envisage a policy that takes the benefits for the migrant, and the 
receiving and sending countries into account? A popular tool among current types of 
selective immigration standards is the Australian-style points-based system. A “fairer 
migration” policy could be modeled on this points system, albeit heavily modified. 
The Australian system ranks people according to how their skills match the 
Australian job market, with accountants and mechanics ranked highly, for example 
(Shachar 2016: 181). Further requirements specify that the migrants should not place 
a significant burden on the Australian health service, have a criminal record, or pose 
any threat to the Australian community (Donald 2016). This system evaluates 
migrants similarly to one of the criteria listed above, namely how beneficial they will 
be to the country they are moving to.  
Conversely, a fairer migration model points system would first consider to what 
degree the potential migrant’s skill is needed in their country of origin, rather than in 
the receiving country. If the individual was particularly unhealthy or considered a 
danger to society, on the other hand, this could also cause positive discrimination to 
be applied, according to this first factor. This person's emigration could be seen as 
potentially contributing positively to the overall level of opportunities in their 
country of origin. Following this logic, doctors, university professors, or engineers 
might be at the back of the queue, if the professions were understaffed in their country 
of origin. This would broadly allow one to limit potential brain drain effects. Second, 
one would need to evaluate how much the overall opportunities in the country they 
are moving to would be improved. If a severe lack of doctors or teachers exists in the 
receiving country, for example, this would cause these professions to be positively 
discriminated. This is because of the positive effect they might have on the level of 
social good, which the opportunities in the receiving country rely upon. This could 
for example allow for easier movement of skilled workers, such as medical 
professionals, from the Global North to the Global South than the other way around. 
This is due their potential impact on overall opportunities being greater in the Global 
South than the negative impacts of their emigration on countries in the Global North. 
Third, in order to progress towards global equality of opportunity, people would have 
to be positively discriminated on the basis of how much their individual opportunities 
would increase by migrating. In other words, two migrants with the same skill set 
could be treated differently depending on how much their skills, or lack thereof, 
benefit them in their country of origin. Faced with many potential migrants, and 
states that are only willing to admit a limited number, this third criterion would 
clearly give priority to those individual migrants whose opportunities would increase 
the most by migrating.  
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In order to explicate how one might balance these factors, this fairer migration 
model can be contrasted with current practices controlling migration. Common 
migration regulations include: requiring people to earn a certain amount before being 
eligible to apply for family reunification; needing to show a minimal amount of 
capital before being accepted on student visas; programs letting people with particular 
skills receive visas; and programs making it easier to migrate if one is sponsored by 
an employer in the receiving country. Clearly, these practices can be criticized based 
on the model presented above. After all, these practices, implicitly or explicitly, 
merely evaluate a potential migrant on the basis of only one of the three criteria, in 
this case how much the receiving country might benefit from their arrival.  
If we consider some of these specific cases according to the fairer migration model, 
we can see that some of the evaluations would be significantly different. In particular, 
it would be more difficult to argue that people should earn a certain amount of money 
for families to be reunified, if the country they emigrate from does not stand to lose 
much from their emigration and their individual opportunities are greatly enhanced 
by migrating. In short, a large positive effect for the migrant and a negligible effect on 
the country of origin would need to be balanced against a slight downside for the 
receiving country due to lack of financial means. In the case of student visas, a case 
might also be made for the students with lesser means being accepted first as it greatly 
improves their individual opportunities, though this has to be weighed against the 
receiving state’s ability to provide higher education. All in all, the kinds of migration 
regulations that merely consider the receiving society would have to take account of 
the impact on the country of origin and on the individual migrant to be justified 
according to this fairer migration model.  
In order to evaluate the viability of such a model, I need to briefly consider some 
of the objections it might face. However, it is important to initially point out that this 
fairer migration model does not rule out other considerations of justice, such as the 
agency of migrants. While it might seem like this system has the potential to be used 
to justify forced movements in order to alleviate global inequalities, it would clearly 
be unjust to do so, since this would contravene the fundamental normative 
consideration of individual agency. Therefore, this system would only apply to people 
who want to migrate, or who already have and are seeking residency. One might 
furthermore object to the fairer migration model by arguing that this kind of 
migration is undesirable, as it could lead to less social unity in the receiving society, 
and that the migrants I propose should be admitted would be perceived as 
undeserving. Another detraction might be that this system could create some 
perverse incentives, whereby individuals would be encouraged to, for example, take 
less education, thereby limiting their opportunities and increasing their possibilities 
to migrate. Finally, one might contend that I am ignoring racial and gender 
discrimination in immigration practices.  
While the above concerns would need to be addressed before such a fairer 
migration model could be implemented, a thorough examination of them is beyond 
the scope of this article. But it is worth adding that the system outlined above also 
needs to be balanced against other aims of general immigration policy. It should not 
overwhelm the receiving society, and there would therefore have to be a limit to the 
numbers of migrants being admitted. It should also not discriminate against people 
arbitrarily, on the basis of such factors as race and gender. And while the system could 
create perverse incentives for some individuals by potentially prioritizing unskilled 
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over skilled migrants, it is also doubtful that these incentives will override their 
motivation to better themselves. Furthermore, a fairer immigration policy should 
allow for migrants to be properly integrated to ensure the continuing democratic 
deliberations of the receiving society, and it would somehow have to be broadly 
accepted among the host population. However, it has to be acknowledged that the 
latter might be hard to achieve in the current anti-immigration climate that prevails 
in many Western democracies. In short, any implementation of the fairer migration 
model would also have to take these objections into consideration.  
I should point out that I think it is unlikely that a system such as the one outlined 
above is likely to be implemented, considering the present situation in which the 
United Nations refugee agency is finding it difficult to convince countries to resettle 
even a limited number of refugees. Therefore, rather than delivering a fully-fledged 
policy proposal, I suggest that these kinds of criteria would be more just according to 
the demands of global justice. In short, I believe this model would be better able to 
fulfill the obligations states have to rectify global inequalities that they are responsible 
for perpetuating. And furthermore, I believe this model would be a far more just 
system than many current admission criteria that positively discriminate in favor of 




In this article I have considered how one might alter migration regulations in order 
to contribute to alleviate global inequality of opportunity. I started by considering 
some of the major objections to the relevance of global inequalities to migration 
regulations, first by discussing how global inequalities might be compared. While I 
agree with the criticism that evaluations between various cultural preferences in 
opportunities can be problematic, I believe that valuable comparisons can be made, 
in particular in relation to health care, education and the job market. Secondly, I 
showed why migration is normatively relevant for considerations of global equality 
of opportunity. In short, as affluent countries both contribute to and benefit from a 
global trading and financial system that significantly diminishes poorer countries’ 
ability to provide opportunities for their citizens, the affluent countries have a moral 
obligation to alter this. Furthermore, since these countries do not significantly 
attempt to alter these underlying conditions, and unfair migration practices are a part 
of an unfair system, it is pertinent to consider what kind of migration might actually 
contribute to alleviating inequalities of opportunity. Third, I argued that greater 
equality of opportunity could in part be met by reevaluating admission policies for 
migrants. Instead of merely considering how much a country might benefit from 
receiving a migrant, one should also consider whether, and to what degree, potential 
migrants might affect the level of opportunity in their country of origin, and to what 
degree their individual opportunities might be improved by migrating.  
I concede that the argument outlined here somewhat oversimplifies affluent states’ 
part in an unjust global trading and financial system. Some states attempt to rectify 
or maintain this international system to varying degrees. Some differences in 
opportunities can also be more readily traced back to national priorities than others. 
Moreover, some countries have more resources than others and are more readily able 
to admit greater numbers of migrants. I have not shown to what degree various states 
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can be seen as responsible for remedying these unjust conditions, as this question is 
beyond the scope of this article. However, this does not take away from the normative 
validity of the central argument. In sum, as affluent states benefit greatly from 
international trading and migration practices to the detriment of less developed 
states, they are morally obliged to alter their immigration practices in a way that 
alleviates these inequalities. And while it may not seem feasible to expect states to 
alter their practices in order to admit migrants whom they do not necessarily benefit 
from admitting, it is certainly not likely that they will alter their practices if their 
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1 This picture is somewhat simplified. Nationalists, such as David Miller (2016a: 76-
93), also agree that states have extensive duties towards refugees, while 
cosmopolitans, such as Kieran Oberman (2016: 49-50) and Joseph Carens (2013: 173-
179), will agree that states have a justifiable right to limit immigration in exceptional 
circumstances, for example for health or security reasons. In other words, there is a 
difference of a degree rather than a strict dichotomy between their positions. 
However, for the purposes of this paper it makes sense to contrast these positions, as 
they differ starkly in relation to migration restrictions for voluntary migrants. 
2 The reason for this focus is that there is more of an agreement that global justice 
should matter when it comes to the treatment of refugees and the forcibly displaced, 
than in relation to those who migrate voluntarily. Furthermore, it seems quite clear 
that forcibly moving people around contravenes other basic moral principles, such as 
individual agency, and it is therefore difficult to see how it can be justified.  
3 The equality of opportunity argument is only one of several arguments Carens puts 
forward for open borders. He also argues that freedom of movement is an important 
right in itself, and that it is important to realize other fundamental human rights 
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(2013: 225-254). However, as it is the equality of opportunity argument I discuss in 
this paper, these other arguments will not be considered. 
4 This is quite a broad definition, and there has been an extensive debate on exactly 
what equality of opportunity consists in. Carens’ argument for equality of 
opportunity relies heavily on Rawls’ description in A Theory of Justice, and since then 
much discussion has revolved around what types of opportunity need to be equalized 
and what other kinds of social goods equality of opportunity relies upon. My 
definition is therefore intentionally broad, in order to be able to accommodate 
various definitions. For various positions on the equality of opportunity globalized, 
see for example Gillian Brock’s Egalitarianism, Ideals, and Cosmopolitan Juistice and 
Darrel Moellendorf’s Equality of Opportunity Globalised? 
5 Scholars do however disagree on the effects migration may have on global 
differences, and what the potential effects of open borders might be. For example, 
Kieran Oberman argues that there is substantial evidence that migration in fact 
reduces poverty (Oberman 2015). Even though it may be the wealthier citizens who 
migrate, and their families who receive remittances, the money that is then invested 
and used has broader effects on the sending society. Furthermore, Oberman argues 
that migration can diffuse knowledge and thereby be beneficial for the sending 
society, and he shows that an increase in high-skilled emigration can also lead to an 
increase in the education of highly skilled persons in society in general. While this 
might be the case, it does not seem to detract from my general line of argument. After 
all, Oberman also points to the negative effects of brain drain, and that migration 
restrictions can justifiably be restricted to limit such effects. 
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